it is pointed out that in many cases the locality forms a space in which a struggle occurs over the symbolic power to define risks.
Attitudes of trust are usually routinely incorporated in day-to-day activities, and in many cases trust is not the result of a conscious act of commitment. Thus trust is not just related to abstract systems but to people's monitoring of everyday life. By way of conclusion I argue that when risks are imperceivable people may maintain their ontological security by ignoring experts' recommendations and not changing their routines for the organizing and monitoring of everyday life. Therefore the knowledge dependency of risks may amplify an ignoring of the risks indicated by the experts.
As Lowe & Rudig (1986) have asserted in their review essay on the current status of environmental sociology, what is needed is not more largescale, mass opinion surveys but detailed studies of local responses (or nonresponses) to specific environmental problems. The reason is that values abstracted from context are relatively meaningless. At the heart of the matter are the critical choices people make in specific contexts and the way these choices are structured and constrained, and it is by detailed case studies that the determinants of concern and action can be elucidated.
This article sheds light on the complex relations between science, risk consciousness and trust, emphasizing their contingent character. Using a constructivist methodology, it discusses local people's understanding of and responses to risks, especially in cases where the people ignore risks which seem to constitute a real threat to their own health. However, local reactions to particular risks have always to be understood in relation to a complex of general and specifically local circumstances, involving an interplay of factors at different levels. To underline that local reactions always have to be contextually understood, the article uses the local responses to the Seveso accident as an illustrative case. In this case the local population seems to mistrust scientific recommendations, whereas in many other cases -as Harry Collins and Bryan Wynne have shown in different studies -lay people have too much trust in experts and their recommendations.
The knowledge-dependency of modern risks
During the later half of the 20th century technology and science has appeared as the most important force of modernization. By the amalgamation of science and craft, technology arose and became an important part of society's production apparatus (Brante & Norman 1995; Kemp 1991; Stehr 1994; Str0mholm 1984; von Wright 1986) . By means of technology and science society's creation of wealth increased drastically -e.g. through the production of goods and reduced work effort. However, during recent decades we have become more and more aware of the dark side of this development. The creation of wealth has been performed through an unlimited exploitation of natural resources and a production of ecological problems and environmental risks (Beck 1992a; Jonas 1984) . These modern environmental risks are of another kind than earlier -pre-modern -natural and man-made risks. Thus, because of technological development and innovations, most of today's environmental problems and risks are technological and not natural. The Beyond the dichotomy objective and subjective risks Thus, if science is the central institution that creates knowledge concerning risks, does it not imply that the central problem is the gap between scientifically measured risk and lay people's perception of it -that is, the well-known dichotomy between objective and subjective risks? However, this dichotomy is a contested one. In 1983 Britain's Royal Society published a report entitled Risk Assessment. This report distinguishes between 'objective' risk (scientifically measurable) and 'perceived' risk (lay person's risk conception). Nine years later a new report from the Royal Society (1992) was published, and in its fifth chapter it says: The view that a separation can be maintained between "objective" risk and "subjective" or perceived risk has come under increasing attack, to the extent that it is no longer a mainstream position.' In that and the following (sixth) chapter it is stated that both the adverse nature of particular events and their probability are inherently subjective. However, to some degree the quoted statement is an exaggeration. Still the mainstream position in literature on risk management seems to be that there is a distinction between objective ('real', 'actual', 'measurable') risk that obeys the laws of statistical theory and subjective risk inaccurately perceived by non-experts. However, in anthropology and in sociology this distinction is contested, and instead there is a cultural perspective on risks (Adams 1995 According to this perspective, risks are culturally constructed. They are viewed through cultural filters; institutional arrangements for monitoring risks through the collection and analysis of statistics relating to mortality, morbidity, economic damage and near misses will all reflect the biases of the collectors and analysts. This filtering process operates both directly through our five senses, and indirectly through extensions to our perceptual apparatus in the form of stories, news reports, statistics and research. These filters are essential and unavoidable, they serve as automatic pilots that largely function without people being aware of it -we do not see that our interpretations are influenced by culture. Thus a cultural perspective on risks unmasks a world of plural rationalities, it discerns order and pattern in risk-taking behaviour and the beliefs that underpin it. Therefore what is seen as an 'objective risk' is also a socially defined risk. This has caused some researchers to claim that in risk issues no one is an expert -or that everyone is an expert. As Beck most radically puts it in his call for the demonopolization of expertise: 'People must say farewell to the notion that administrations and experts always know exactly, or at least better, what is right and good for everyone' (Beck 1994:29. Cf. also Giddens 1994b).
Most of the researchers who apply a cultural and constructivist perspective do not deny the actual existence of risks, but emphasize that all knowledge about risk -even the scientist's -is bound to its context. It is the social and cultural context which determines what a certain group, community or society perceives as hazardous and non-hazardous. Thus what we know about environmental risks does not spring up out of reality itself but is a product of social interpretation. Our knowledge -whether it concerns the non-human or the human world -derives from concepts (or VOLUME 39 categories) we impose on it rather than a simple and neutral recognition of the objective properties of that world itself. We are all living in cultures which presume to function as filters when people perceive objects in the surrounding world. Thus objects are not simply waiting in the world to be perceived or defined as risky but are instead cultural and social constructions (cf. Hillgartner 1992).
However, this standpoint is not that of phenomenalism, where only propositions about observed phenomena have the status of genuine knowledge, which is to say that language and concept have no references beyond themselves. Our interpretation is always constrained by independent objective realities. Even if our knowledge is a product of our social classifications and perceptions, it is at the same time a product of independent objective properties to which such categories may or may not approximate. Even if these independent properties come through the social mediation, and knowledge about them is socially created by humans, the social construction of reality is constrained by reality itself, and a construction at variance with reality may prove very costly (Dietz et al. 1989 ). Thus all human perception is dependent on social factors, but not reducible to them.
The point is that even if there exist certain risks, our knowledge of them is not given. Instead knowledge about them has to be produced, and this knowledge production has social as well as realistic dimensions. Thus many times there seems to exist a relation between people's risk perception and the risks, but it is not a simple relation because objective conditions never themselves produce an awareness of risks. As Kitsuse & Spector (1981:200-201) 
put it:
One need not assume nor explain the existence of this objective condition; indeed, to do so would deflect attention from investigation of the definitional process. The definition may be accompanied by empirically verifiable claims about the scale, intensity, distribution, and effects of the imputed social conditions: but it may not and theoretically it need not.
At the same time it needs to be emphasized that natural realities constrain our options in various ways: individuals and groups do not usually get upset over nothing, group definitions of social problems usually do have reference to some empirically verifiable conditions. Through this it becomes possible to both emphasize the social dimension of knowledge and at the same time assert that statements on risks in many cases refer to real things. Of course there is a great degree of freedom in the understanding, but it is not total. The social construction of reality is constrained by reality itself, the object constrains what discourse can say about it, it is a construction of something. However, when it comes to the kind of risk discussed in this article -with an increasing remoteness from the perception and experience of the public -reality will, at least in the short run, provide very few constraints and instead there is a great opportunity to develop different standpoints.
Science -an institution for building trust?
If science is the principal institution which can provide us with knowledge concerning modern environmental risks, is it not then also the case that it is an institution which creates trust? For of course the fact is that authorities, environmental movements and lay people appear very dependent on the knowledge that science produces -is it not natural that science then also should be regarded as the institution capable of managing and controlling environmental risk, be regarded as the principle guarantor of safety? And at the same time: if science is an institution that provides both knowledge and trust, has it not then also a large manipulative capacity, a capacity to govern people's notions of what constitutes a risk and what constitutes a neutralization of this risk? But is science not then also an institution that certain interests make use of in order to legitimate risks and create social acceptance?
Francois Ewald has stressed that science performs a new role as being the basis for the 'insurance society', which is to say a society which is an enormous insurance against all the risks that its own development produces (Ewald 1986 ). Technology and science have provided man with the opportunity to protect himself and control the risks. This is done foremost through mathematical calculation whereby the attempt is made to foresee the probability and consequences of particular technological events. By means of a calculus of probability -that is, mathematization of every kind of risks -all risks have become manageable. And when it comes to activities where it is possible neither to guarantee sufficient safety nor to organize a comprehensive after-care system, the risks are legitimated by bringing up the dogma of the infallibility of technology (Beck 1992b ). Thus in modern society science and technology have become central institutions to legitimate those activities that generate modern risks. The role of science is not limited to being the institution that discovers and conveys knowledge about risks, it seems also to be an important institution through which trust is created.
However, when approaching concrete events, people's reactions to risks seem not to be guided by scientific knowledge. Also, it is debatable if it really is through science lay people gain trust. The social authority of science seems not to be unconditional. In the case of Seveso, the local population's first return to their homes was consciously against the instructions both of the local authority and of the scientific commission. And the number of similar examples of the ignoring of the recommendations of experts and authorities concerning risks is legion. People's perception of and reactions to risks have to be understood as phenomena largely influenced by their contexts, as created by a complex of general and specifically local circumstances. In some circumstances the public mistrust science because they feel that their knowledge on their own turf is better (which Brian Wynne found in the case of sheepfarmers' conflicts with agricultural researchers in their judgement of the consequences of Chernobyl). In other cases people's mistrust of -or trust in -science has other causes.
Before discussing the relation between science and trust more in detail, I will devote attention to findings from research on human responses to natural and technological hazards. Despite the rather atheoretical studies carried out in these fields (especially concerning natural hazards), the fact that people seem to ignore hazards and risks strengthens the doubts concerning the importance of science as an institution through which knowledge of risk is created and through which trust is built.
Human responses to hazards
Why do people persist in occupying areas that are hazardous? This question has been important for research on human responses to natural and technological hazards, a research earlier conducted by geographers but which other social scientists more recently have begun to pay attention to. In the following I limit my attention to investigating those factors the researcher claims to be decisive for people in their responses to and ignoring of a hazard.
Research on natural hazards
A number of empirically oriented studies of hazard-prone areas conducted in the 1960s and early 1970s found that people did not recognize they were in danger; their response to preventive measures was dependent in part on whether they had experienced a hazard before; the knowledge and evaluation were influenced by such factors as experience, social communication and their understanding of and trust in the accuracy of warnings (Burton et al. 1978 :34-52). However, later research emphasized the contingency of people's reaction to a potential or actual calamity, stressing the importance of the political, cultural and social contexts in which the hazards come into being. There are social factors and forces that make people face environmental risks (or downplay them). Important to notice is that different social situations create different human responses to, and strategies to cope with, a calamity (White 1986). Thus hazards are embedded in larger societal structures and to understand human responses to hazards it seems to be important to analyse the social and political contexts (Cutter 1993) .
A review of more recently written literature on this matter indicates the following factors which make people stay in hazard-prone areas (Alexander 1993; Burton et al. 1978; Cutter 1993; Haggett 1983; Mitchell 1989 ; O'Riordan 1986; White 1986; Whyte 1986): (i) limited option to move, in some cases even lack of alternative opportunities (e.g. lack of resources which allow them to migrate to less hazardous areas); (ii) economic incentives for staying. Studies of places which are characterized by their hazardousness have shown that economic opportunities (recognizable and tangible benefits for staying) are one of the reasons why people continue to live in hazardous zones despite the existence of measurable and known levels of risk. Also, studies have shown that high ratios of reserves to potential loss influence people's willingness to stay; (iii) earlier experience of hazards which has made people create coping strategies; (iv) ignoring of the hazard by misperception and sometimes even ignorance or non-comprehension of the threat; and (v) sense of community regarding the area, i.e. a social and geographical belonging to a place.
Noticeable is that the role of scientific knowledge and expertise is not given any particular attention, except that non-comprehension of the threat is one factor that impels people to stay in hazard-prone areas.4 However, natural hazard is only one kind of hazard which forms a threat to humankind. The other one is technological hazard.5
The importance of economic factors Technological hazards are related to industrial development and its use of science and technology. In the 1970s a growing awareness of these kinds of man-made risks and hazards emerged, not least because of nuclear power. The research on natural hazards got a counterpart in the research on technological hazards, such as nuclear power, transportation and workplace accidents, toxic substances, explosions, airport noise and global atmospheric pollution (Cutter 1993 According to this research, the difference between technological and natural hazards is that they have different origins, thus provoking different social responses. The man-made hazards are also seen as having a larger impact on society (in the form of for example mortality, social costs, ecosystem productivity, species extinction, pollution) than their natural counterparts. Furthermore, technological hazards are not only more pervasive, they are also more diffuse and less publicly recognizable. Thus the public have to rely more on the scientific community and experts to provide them with knowledge about technological risks and hazards. To this I would like to add that technological risks seem to have a stronger and more apparent economic dimension: in many cases technological risks are secondary effects of an activity which some interests have seen as a necessity. This is most apparent when it comes to the siting of toxic industry and other riskgenerating activities. Researchers have emphasized that a main reason why people stay in hazard-prone areas is economic. Some groups have no resources which allow them to move to other, less risky, areas, and instead of coping strategies are elaborated and a particular risk consciousness is created. Concerning technological risks, economic incentives are often actively used by authorities and companies to get local acceptance for a hazardous activity. A community which originally perceives a proposed siting of plant as a LULU (locally unwanted land use) may through economic incentives become positive towards a siting. In fact, economic incentives can make communities actually compete for such plants. This strategy -to pay economic compensation to the people living in the vicinity -is even put forward by some researchers as an important means of settling a siting conflict and getting local acceptance for a plant (Carter 1987; Openshaw et al. 1989 ).
In their cross-national study of radwaste siting, Blowers et al. (1991:325ff.) have found four kinds of incentive for community acceptance when it comes to the siting of spent nuclear fuel: (i) economic (e.g. fiscal consequences of a facility, property tax levies, job opportunities, offer of other more desirable projects); (ii) environmental (e.g. landscape improvements); (iii) socio-cultural (e.g. infrastructural improvements such as services, schools, roads); (iv) medical (e.g. medical care, safety, public health projects). Even if this package contains different kinds of incentives, they are all made possible by economic means (economic support and allowances).
The importance of sociospatial factors
As we have seen above, the research on natural as well as technological hazards tells us that despite the fact that the local population have some knowledge about the hazards and risks, they judge their situation to be not as risky as the scientists argue. Their judgement is not based on a simple lack of knowledge but rather on integration of the knowledge of the risks in a specific consciousness which involves a downplay of these risks and where coping strategies have been integrated to become a part of the people's daily activities. As we have seen, this research heavily emphasizes the role of economic factors. In some cases the local population have no option but to move due to lack of economic resources of their own or lack of economic support from the authorities. In other cases the economic situation of a community makes it welcome every kind of industrial activity which creates employment opportunities, even if the activity also generates risks.
However, the economic factors are important but not decisive and the hazard research has found that the sense of community and place is an important factor making it understandable why people stay in hazard-prone areas. During the last couple of decades the theme 'sense of place' has assumed a position of central importance among many social scientists, not least human geographers. They see it as 'a center of meanings, intentions, or felt values; a focus of emotional or sentimental attachment, a locality of felt significance' (Pred 1983:49) . The philosophical basis for the discussion of 'sense of place' seems to be existential phenomenology (Entrikin 1976 Similarly, other studies have shown that this kind of factor -emotional, cultural or sociospatial -is in many cases important in explaining why people in some cases fight to stay in a potentially hazardous place as well as why communities vigorously fight to be -or not to be -a host for a riskgenerating activity. In many cases a sociospatial consciousness has developed amongst the local population, a consciousness which includes a social as well as a geographical belonging (cf. Cohen 1982; Ekman 1991; Lidskog 1994, ch. 8).
Thus economic factors and economic incentives should not be seen as the only motivating forces that make people return to or stay in areas which are associated with risks and hazards. There are also other kinds of motivational factors, e.g. emotional, sociospatial and cultural. In the case of Seveso, it was not purely economic reasons which made people return to their homes, at least not in their first return. During the first months the authorities paid the provisional residence and living expenses for the former neighbours of the ICMESA plant. Despite that, they returned three months after the catastrophe, and the authorities had to move them from the area by force. However, the following year the local population began a second return, this time with the authorities' permission. This time economic factors were important: neither the company nor the authorities paid any economic compensation to the local population to cover expenses for living in another place. At the same time the local people were forbidden to cultivate the land or clear their gardens, this because of the dioxine contamination.
4. Social authority and cognitive reflexivity Today, several researchers stress the role of science and experts in creating environmental consciousness amongst lay people (Jamison et al. 1990 ). In a similar way, science is pointed out by some social scientists as central to the construction -and deconstruction -of risk consciousness (Beck 1992a; Giddens 1991a). However, the results from the research on human responses to natural and technological hazards do not support this view, deemphasizing as it does the role of science in this matter. One may wonder about the extent to which these findings are an artefact produced by the assumptions and design of the hazard research itself. Could it be a reflection of the fact that earlier hazard researchers to a large degree ignore the role of science, presupposing that lay people's reactions are irrational per se? Or are the findings an important corrective to an over-emphasizing of the role of science? Research in several other areas supports the view that science is not so central in the risk consciousness of human beings, and this section discusses this by focusing on the social authority of science and the need of intermediary links between the scientific community and lay people.
To have social authority means for science that scientific knowledge is perceived as the kind of knowledge that has predominance over other forms of knowledge. In a general sense, this seems to be valid. By the amalgamation of science and craft, technology arose and became an important part of society's production. However, technology became not only important for society's production, but also for science itself. Through the material effect of technology, science acquired a broad practical and ideological role. Its embodiment in technology has provided science with both power and legitimacy. Thus we live in a society where science is a very important part of culture and self-understanding (cf. Stehr 1994; Wynne 1993).
However, that science on a general level has social authority does not necessarily mean that lay people always perceive it as credible, relevant and trustworthy. In discussing science's lack of social authority I will point out three factors of importance, namely the heterogeneity of science, the reflexivity of science, and the reflexivity of the subject. However, the heterogeneity of science has not only epistemological grounds, it is also propelled by the ongoing pluralization of science's organizational form. Traditional academies such as universities and official research institutions are no longer alone in their claim to be legitimate producers of scientific knowledge. During recent decades various other actors -such as private consultants and research departments of industry and of interest organizations -have laid claim to scientific legitimacy too. Scientific knowledge claims appear in different organizational forms, and in many cases are given legitimacy both by lay people and by governmental agencies. In Sweden, for example, the National Environmental Protection Agency seems not to bother about different consultants' and experts' lack of epistemic base (PhD degree, etc.) and lack of institutional role and formal authority (position in the academy). Instead, the NEPA's judgement of the relevance of knowledge is central.
That science is an important part of culture does not mean that people (and authorities) passively listen to science and follow its recommendations and instructions. Rather, it means that science in many cases is given the role of legitimizing and supporting different convictions. However, not only are lay people and politicians able to choose between different scientific products and expert groups but also these products and groups can be played off against each other within and between disciplines. In this way the autonomy of the lay people and the politicians is increased at the expense of the social authority of science.
Secondly, the increased reflexivity of science opens up the possibility of questioning the knowledge claims of science. Drawing on Beck (1992a, ch. 7), a difference can be made between primary and reflexive scientization. At first, science was applied to a 'given' world of nature, people and society. Scientific scepticism demystified the social and natural world. However, science's own claim of rationality was still spared from the application of scientific scepticism.
To emphasize the reflexive character of science means that scientific scepticism is extended to the inherent foundations and external consequences of science itself. A process of demystification of science is then started, which involves the introducing of a historical consciousness in the understanding of science. This demystification opens up new possibilities of questioning science and its foundations of rationality. The unbinding of scepticism under the condition of reflexive scientization means that no scientific statement is 'true' in the old sense, i.e. unquestionable, eternal truth. Through the loss of truth science is in need of social enforcement of its validity claims and it has to struggle to gain legitimacy.
A third factor of importance is the reflexivity of the human being. Irrespective of the fact that there exists different interpretations of the concept of reflexivity -moral-cognitive (Beck 1992a), strategic-cognitive (Giddens 1991a, b) a-nd aesthetic-expressive (Lash & Urry 1994) -they all share the view that the reflexive subject is to be characterized by a capacity to distance himself or herself from monitoring and critically reflect upon it. The knowledgeability of the agent implies a particular human capacity to act reflexively, to provide discursive interpretations of his or her behaviour (see e.g. Giddens 1991b:35). In modernity, this reflexivity consists of social practices being constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information received about them, thus altering the constitution of them.
Beck, Giddens and Lash & Urry also share the view that new socialstructural arrangements in late modernity have opened up spaces for increasing reflexivity of the subjects. There is an ongoing process of detraditionalization in which social and cognitive agents are increasingly 'set free' from the heteronomous control or monitoring of social structure in order to be self-monitoring or self-reflexive. This process also involves a radical enhancement of individualization, where individuals have a growing freedom from social structures which enables them to reflect upon the various spheres of social life. Thus the reflexivity of late modernity opens up a larger role for agency, owing to the fact that it creates a situation of greater choice between alternative means, ends, conditions and legitimations of actions. And this has a strong influence on the social authority of science.
Through the process of reflexivity, science is no longer a more legitimate activity than many other social activities, each of which involves different forms of judgement. Science is no longer viewed as having a necessarily civilizing, progressive and emancipatory role in revealing what society is like. Also the environmental and medical sciences have suffered a loss of authority which in turn causes problems for both the Green movement and environmental agencies owing to their dependency on these sciences (cf. Yearley 1991:113). As Giddens (1994b:185-6) puts it:
... the specific authority which science once enjoyed, which turned it into a sort of tradition, could only be protected in so far as there was an insultation dividing scientific expertise from the diverse forms of knowledgeability of lay populations ... But this dividing line is no longer a generalized one, sealing off science as a whole from the 'local knowledge' of lay persons. The very specializations which expertise undergoes make it obvious to everyone that there can be no 'experts of all experts', but that all expert claims to knowledge are not only very specific but also liable often to be internally contested. The fact that experts frequently disagree becomes familiar terrain for almost everyone. More than this, however, the claim to universal legitimacy of science becomes much more disputed than before.
To sum up, the heterogeneity of science, the reflexivity of science and the reflexivity of the subjects have constituted a situation of openness in the interpretation of reality. People of today have greater possibility of ignoring scientific statements on risks. The new autonomy of people vis-a-vis science is not necessarily based on the ignoring of knowledge but can instead be based on differentiation within science and the possibility of different scientific interpretations. However, before discussing these implications for science's social authority and the relation between experts' risk perceptions and public trust, I need first to touch on the role of intermediary links between science and the public.
Science and the public: the importance of intermediary links As emphasized at the beginning of this article, modern risks are inconceivable for lay people, they are remote from the perception and the experience of the individual. From this point of view, science can be seen as an extension of human perception. However, it is important to notice that the picture of science as an extended sensory organ is misleading in at least one sense: no lay people have direct knowledge of science, and science does not speak directly to people. In fact, science in many cases is so specialized that there is very limited opportunity for interdisciplinary discussion. Concerning the global climate change, for example, it is not science in general but the most technical-centred and natural-scientific-oriented research which defines the basic problem and proposes relevant solutions (Jamison 1993; Wynne 1993 Commonly, these transnational organizations produce the material that the media later publish or broadcast. In many cases these organizations also spread their messages directly to the public through their own magazines and newsletters. This is reinforced by the environmental movements', the environmental agencies' and the mass media's finite 'carrying capacities' for critically evaluating the knowledge and understanding that these powerful organizations mediate (cf. Hillgartner 1992).
Media, organizations and big business firms most often propose an understanding of environmental problems as solvable through new technology. The trust in experts and technologies seems to be a central feature of both Greenpeace and other transnational organizations as well as big enterprises such as Asea Brown Boveri (Jamison 1993). Thus these intermediary links seem to reinforce the scientization of the public understanding of the environmental problems and risks. However, I would like to raise a warning against an all too one-sided view of the role of intermediary links in the scientization of the public understanding. Maybe science and experts are not so important as it is assumed? Or maybe these intermediary links are important not only in transferring the view of science to lay people but also in developing alternative perspectives? 5. Scientific risks and everyday life As mentioned above, science is far from unanimous in its definition of environmental risks. Even in cases where an intra-scientific closure has been 46 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 1996 VOLUME 39 reached -through a convergence in interpretation and a resolution of underlying conceptual and cognitive conflict (Engelhardt & Caplan 1987) -a conflict may arise when scientific results are transferred to the spheres of politics and the public. In scientific communities social judgements are made which confirm and close certain scientific constructions of knowledge. However, when this knowledge is to be spread amongst the public, this closed construction has to be re-opened, deconstructed and negotiated in a new social context, a context which does not necessarily share the view of reality of the scientific community (Wynne 1993) . This means that a reinterpretation of the scientific perspective and results is possible even in cases where the scientific community is unanimous. And in these cases where a scientific controversy exists, it often acquires larger proportions when transferred to the more complex social and political contexts constituted by the larger society. Thus science is deconstructed and reconstructed in this transformation process.
The intermediary links are therefore not to be perceived as passive and neutral parts of a transmission process where scientific results are converted to public understanding. Rather, these actors are creators of knowledge which re-formulates the scientific perspective. This is most visible when it comes to the environmental movements' role both in the creation of the environmental consciousness of the public and in formulating new issues and perspectives which have heavily influenced the environmental sciences (Eyerman & Jamison 1991). However, the production of knowledge is not limited to science and the intermediary links. In a basic sense the lay people produce knowledge too, albeit of another kind than scientific knowledge.
Local identity and risk consciousness
'People react to the risks they come to believe exist' states a researcher in risk psychology (Sjoberg 1987 :3) . But what risks do people believe exist, and what makes them believe that these particular risks exist? To assume that objects are simply waiting in the world to be perceived or defined as risky is fundamentally unsociological. Instead they are constructed in a social context; thus what is perceived as a risk or as a non-risk is culturally and socially determined (Douglas 1986; Douglas & Wildavsky 1983 ). Most basically, our sense of what is real is produced with our associates, which is to say those we socially interact with (Berger & Luckman 1967; Schutz 1972) . Social networks support particular risk consciousness and ignoring of risk, as exemplified in the case of hazardous oases. In the course of time a 'subjective immunity' often occurs, meaning that a hazard to such an extent becomes integrated in the everyday knowledge of the people living in proximity to it that they do not reflect upon its risks or indeed upon its very existence (Douglas 1986:29ff.) . It is a natural part of their surroundings and life, and coping strategies have been integrated in their everyday life. In risk research there is a unanimity of opinion to the effect that people reckon they will cope with familiar situations, and that they underestimate risks which are assumed to be under their control. Thus the hazard or the hazardous activity is brought into the collective consciousness and everyday life, whereby a gradual habituation to risks and a subjective immunity are elaborated.
However, the process which leads to subjective immunity may very well have its origins in force. As Giddens puts it, 'trust is much less of a "leap to commitment" than a tacit acceptance of circumstances in which other alternatives are largely foreclosed' (Giddens 1991a:90) . This can be seen in the case of Seveso, where the returning people seem to have gradually developed a subjective immunity, this despite the fact that several investigations later have stated that large areas are contaminated by dioxine, and by the fact that some 100,000 animals died or were slaughtered as an emergency measure (Weir 1987) . However, as in many other cases, a lack of economic resources and a social and spatial belonging may have prevented the local population from moving, and instead cognitive strategies developed which integrated the risk with their consciousness and their monitoring of everyday life.8
In many cases these social networks are limited to local contexts. Most people still live their lives locally and their consciousness is formed in a distinct geographical place (Massey 1984) . Evidence that supports this spatial binding of risk consciousness is the finding that compliance to pollution increased with the length of residence in an area and had no high correlation with either socio-economic characteristics or the dissemination of information by the media (Mitchell 1989:190) . Thus not only are science and intermediary links active parties in the knowledge production and dissemination, the local population is too. The values, consciousness and social and spatial belonging of the local population are important parts of their own knowledge production concerning risks. And scientific knowledge may not self-evidently take precedence over this local and practical knowledge (cf. Thrift 1990).9
Thus the locality seems to be very important in the formation of a local identity and consciousness (Cohen 1982; Cox & Mair 1991) . However, a warning needs to be raised against seeing consciousness as purely locally determined (Sayer 1990 ). Even if consciousness derives from shared knowledge and shared experience of both the social and geographical environment and history, it needs to be emphasized that the creation of local consciousness and of socio-spatial identity is performed in a wider context, involving social structures and practices of non-local kinds. A belonging to a community is mediated by affiliations which are deriving from various 'larger scale' institutional practices in which people are involved in their daily routines (Paasi 1991) . Furthermore, in the case of a modern community people are not born into its symbol system, but have to choose to join it or not (Lash & Urry 1994:50). Therefore, most often, places do not have single unique identities and interests but are full of internal conflicts (Massey 1991) . This forms the basis of why a proposed siting can have such different meanings for different groups and professions. Different historical meanings attributed to the place together with their interest in a siting affect the people's interpretation, emotional experience and reactions.
Conflicts over risks emerge when actors have different perspectives, interests and understandings of a phenomenon or an activity. In many cases there exists a struggle whether an industrial activity constitutes a risk or not, a struggle not only between the community and external actors, but between various actors within the community as well. For example, many farmers in the vicinity of a plant foster a risk consciousness different from that of the local workers at the plant. Thus in many local settings there emerges an explicit struggle over the symbolic power to define what risk isthat is, a struggle for cognitive authority (cf. Jasanoff 1987). In this struggle it is power relations that make it possible for some actors to impose on others their particular risk discourses.
Concluding discussion
It is common to state that science has become the paradigm of all knowledge in the Western world (Quine & Ullian 1978, ch. 1). However, as I have argued in this article, even if this may be true in a general way it does not mean that the public necessarily perceives science as trustworthy and as a provider of adequate knowledge. Instead, the public's perspective on science and technological knowledge is characterized more by its ambivalence.
The pluralization and reflexivity of science together with the reflexivity of the subject implies a sceptical attitude to the knowledge claims of science. Science is made human in the sense that its social and value-laden character is revealed. That science does not speak directly to the politicians and the public but is dependent on intermediary links is another cause of the public's ambivalent view of it. It is through intermediary links that scientific statements and results become known amongst people outside the scientific community, and these intermediary linkages are not to be perceived as neutral knowledge carriers, but to be seen more as active knowledge creators. The reflexivity of the human subject also implies an increasing capacity of lay people to question science and experts.
The importance of intermediary links has been further elaborated by Giddens (1991a, b) . Starting from a strategic meaning of reflexivity -that is, reflexivity as a means for the subject to create ontological security -Giddens elaborates the concepts expert system and access point. The expert systems 'bracket' time and space through the deployment of modes of technical knowledge and of social knowledge (Giddens 1991a:18) . This bracketing creates order (i.e. predictable routine) out of chaos for the individual. Modern man's trust in expert systems (and other abstract systems) creates islands of certainty in a world characterized by risks and hazards. Trust is maintained or built up at 'access points' -that is, points of connection between lay people and the representatives of abstract systems (e.g. professional experts).
Attitudes of trust are usually routinely incorporated in day-to-day activities, and in many cases trust is not the result of a conscious act of commitment. Thus trust is not just related to abstract systems but also to people's monitoring of everyday life. However, Giddens does not pay any further attention to the possibility that expert systems may threaten the ontological security of lay people by making great demands for change in their everyday lives. Even in cases where risks and hazards are concrete and perceivable (clearly delimited in time and space), such as in the case of natural hazards, a risk consciousness can be downplayed for the benefit of staying in a hazard-prone area, and gradually a subjective immunity develops. Concerning modern risks there may even be greater possibilities of ignoring the experts' view. Modern environmental risks have very complex relations between cause and effect, and the negative consequences are delayed. This means that reality, at least in the short run, provides very few constraints in the interpretation and instead there is a great opportunity to develop different standpoints. When risks are imperceivable people may maintain their ontological security through the ignoring of experts' recommendations: no one has seen the risks which science is talking about, and if everyday life has to be drastically changed to avoid the risk exposure, people may choose to ignore the experts' and authorities' recommendations to the advantage of their routine organizing and monitoring of everyday life.
From this point of view, many of the present social theories concerning risks and trust seem to be cognitive-centred. The stress on the role of scientific knowledge and experts causes these theories to heavily emphasize the role of science as the producer of public risk consciousness as well as public trust. Human beings are foremost seen as reflexive in a cognitive sense. This is most visible in the writings of Ulrich Beck. For him it is the self-reflection of knowledge on knowledge which forms the basis for his questioning of science. Reflexive scientization -contrary to primary scientization -opens up new possibilities of influence and development in the process of the production and application of scientific results. The exposure of scientific uncertainty is the liberation of politics, law and the public sphere from their patronization by technocracy, involving a questioning of the monopoly of scientists and engineers in the diagnosis of hazards. However, the opportunity to emancipate social practice from science occurs through science (Beck 1992a: ch. 7). It is a form of scientization of the protest against science, involving a plea for an alternative science to the established one (Beck 1992b:119):
Only a strong competent public debate, 'armed' with scientific arguments, is capable of separating the scientific wheat from the chaff and allowing the institutions for directing technology -politics and law -to reconquer the power of their own judgement To sum up, conflicts over risk issues are rooted in deep cultural, social and political soil, they touch on matters of accountability, the legitimacy of government and, not least, the adequacy and authority of scientific knowledge. The invisibility of modern risks does not necessarily mean that lay people's dependence on scientific knowledge will increase. On the contrary, it opens up the possibility of ignoring the experts' definition of risks, because of its lack of manifest, visible effects, at least in the short run. Moreover, when scientific knowledge is to be spread amongst the public, this closed construction has to be re-opened, deconstructed and negotiated in a new social context, a context which does not necessarily share the view of reality of the scientific community. Thus the social authority and credibility of science are contested by the public. The lay people's critical question is, according to Wynne, 'Who controls the scale, distribution and reversibility of the risk -is it an agent I understand, and trust? What is the meaning of the proposed risk and the nature of alternative courses of action?' (Wynne 1980:190) . This is strengthened by Aaron Wildavsky's findings from empirically testing rival theories of risk perception, where it is revealed that it is not knowledge per se, but confidence in institutions and the credibility of information, that is at issue (Wildavsky & Dake 1990 ). Thus, he concludes, the great struggle over the perceived dangers of technology in our time is cultural, it concerns essentially trust in and distrust of, societal institutions.
An investigation made by the University of Milan and published 1994 found that the accident at Seveso has caused a number of cases of cancer among the local population.10 The University of Pavio has found, by reanalysing the blood tests made 18 years ago, that the amount of dioxine in the blood of people living in the vicinity of the Seveso plant is the highest ever known, even higher than that found in former Vietnam soldiers (NaNt 94-05-17). That these scientific results will bring forth any reaction amongst the local population or any initiative by the authorities is -in accordance with the arguments given in this article -anything but a matter of course. 4 However, it should be mentioned that according to the 'vulnerability thesis' in hazard research, knowledge is put in the foreground. The way to change people's misperception of a threat is to provide basic knowledge of what hazard they face and how they can cope with it.
5The distinction between natural and technological, or natural and man-made, hazards is -as noted above -to be seen as a contested dichotomy with today's far-reaching human influence on nature and the environment. In the case of many of the hazards that are perceived as natural it is possible to trace a human involvement in their origin (for a discussion, see Lidskog 1994, ch. 8).
6 Compare with 'hazardous culture' -that is, hazard-prone areas where there has emerged a consciousness amongst the local population which involves a downplay of the risks, and where the coping strategies have been integrated to become a regular part of daily activities (Burton et al. 1978; Cutter 1993 ? Haggett (1983:241) discusses different strategies for coping with a natural hazard: deny its existence ('it can't happen here'); deny its recurrence ('lightning can't strike twice in the same place'); learn the frequency ('floods come every five years'); transfer responsibility to a higher power ('it is in the hand of God, or, it is in the hand of government'). By these coping strategies, the hazard is cognitively integrated in the local population's consciousness. 
